The Effects Of Intervention In Syria

The effects of the increasingly certain attack on the Assad regime by the U.S., the U.K. and France (and perhaps others) depends on what kind of attack is made. If it is only a few, or a few dozen attacks, like Clinton's attacks on targets in Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998 or the attacks on Iraq in late 1998 the same years, to send Assad the message that he has been a bad boy and this is the punishment, it won't have much effect.

But if it is meant to tip the balance in favor of the rebels then it will have serious implications, both positive and negative. Assuming it succeeds, the one positive is that it will weaken Iran and Hezbollah, as the Assad regime has been acting as a middleman for Iran's weapon deliveries to Hezbollah. But a Syria run by  a weak government or Sunni jihadists who despise Iran and Hezbollah (because they're Shi'ites and supported Assad) but hate Israel even more is unlikely to make serious efforts to stop such weapons deliveries.

The possible negative effects are more far reaching. A rebel victory would at best create another weak state plagued by low intensity civil war like in Iraq or Libya, with safe havens for Sunni jihadists. At worst, Syria could become another jihadist state, like Afghanistan under the Taleban or current day Gaza. Either way, it would represent a victory for al-Qaeda and other Sunni jihadists. And the Alawites and Christians of Syria would face constant persecution and attacks at best, and large scale massacres at worst.

The blame for that would lie entirely on Obama, Cameron, Hollande and other political leaders participating in this attack. But of course, for them, the increased strength of Sunni jihadists is simply convenient since it is their standard excuse for their large scale snooping.